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NOTES
The husband's administrative duties as "head and master" have
many similarities to the duties of a trustee under the Louisiana Trust
Code," although there is by no means a direct analogy. The com-
munity of gains could be considered similar to a trust for both
spouses, with the husband serving as trustee."5 Certainly the husband
has greater freedom of action than a trustee, but the wife is not
without substantial protection against acts deliberately to her preju-
dice, and she need never suffer personal liability because of the hus-
band's acts:
The wife has an acquired right to sue for a separation of property
during the marriage in case of mismanagement, an acquired right
to accept or renounce the community upon its dissolution, an
acquired right to accept the community with benefit of inventory
upon dissolution, an acquired right to sue the husband or his
heirs for an alienation made in fraud, and an acquired right to
demand an accounting for enrichment of the husband's separate
and paraphernal estate from the community of gains."
The Civil Code provides a plan of order between the husband and
the wife under which the spouses agree to pool certain of their assets
and certain liabilities incurred by the husband in their common inter-
est. Upon dissolution of the community, the wife is given several
alternatives whereby she may benefit from their gains during mar-
riage without risking the loss of more than half of the community
assets. This benefit she would lose if she either "owned" an interest
in the combined assets and liabilities or participated in its manage-
ment. The Creech decision properly defines the wife's and the hus-
band's relationship in the community of gains thereby preserving the
matrimonial regime as envisioned in the Civil Code.
Gerald E. Songy
CHILD CUSTODY: PREFERENCE TO THE MOTHER
The granting of custody of minor children pursuant to a judicial
separation or divorce is governed by Civil Code articles 146 and 157.
In provisional proceedings prior to a judgment of separation or di-
vorce, if custody is contested, article 146 provides that preference will
be given the mother.' However, according to article 157, once a judg-
44. LA. R.S. 9:2061-2128 (1950).
45. Id.; LA. R.S. 9:1781 (1950): "A trustee is a person to whom title to the trust
property is transferred to be administered by him as a fiduciary."
46. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497, 508 (La. 1973).
1. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146: "If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional
keeping is claimed by both husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and unde-
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ment is rendered, the person who obtains the separation or divorce
should be granted custody.'
In spite of the express language of article 157, the provisional
preference to the mother has been extended to all custody proceed-
ings. :' The courts have established the presumption that the welfare
of the children can best be served by granting custody to the mother.'
cided, it shall be granted to the wife, whether plaintiff or defendant; unless there
should be strong reasons to deprive her of it, either in whole or in part, the decision
whereof is left to the discretion of the judge." This statutory preference to the wife was
created by Act 124 of 1888, amending Civil Code article 146, which had preferred the
husband. This preference to the father was based upon the notion of paternal authority
which existed during the feudal era. The child, relegated to the status of a paternal
chattel, owed his services to the father whose interests were foremost; as compensation
for these services, the father was responsbile for supplying the child with his basic
necessities and thus was his natural guardian.
Thereafter, the concept evolved that men could not rear children; thus, disposition
of custody was inevitably granted to the mother because of the "essential" nature of
her maternal role. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Follow-
ing Divorce, 21 SYR. L. REv. 55 (1969). This position was recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872): "The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood . . .. The paramount destiny and mission
of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law
of the Creator."
Only recently has the child's best interests been a major consideration in custody
cases. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce,
21 SYR. L. REV. 55 (1969). But, the continued predetermination that the mother is
entitled to custody has resulted in awarding her the child in over ninety percent of
divorce cases. Of course, many of these awards may have been based upon a genuine
belief that the mother is better-suited for rearing the children. Also, often the mother
is awarded custody because the father fails to contest it; this may be due to his
knowledge of the almost non-rebuttable presumption favoring the mother. Drinan, The
Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM. L. 101 (1962).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 157: "[Tlhe children shall be placed under the care of the
party who shall have obtained the separation or divorce unless the judge shall, for the
greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall be entrusted to
the care of the other party."
3. "Notwithstanding LSA-C.C. art. 157 .. ., the mother is preferred in custody
proceedings unless she be shown to have forfeited her right to custody." Jones v.
Timber, 247 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
4. In Louisiana, the "paramount consideration in determining to whom custody
should be granted is always the welfare of the children." Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20,
24-25, 258 So. 2d 857, 859 (1972). See also Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 1127, 254 So.
2d 603, 605 (1971); Drouin v. Hildenbrand, 235 La. 810, 105 So.2d 532 (1958). But the
welfare of the children is automatically presumed better served by awarding custody
to the mother. Abreo v. Abreo, 281 So. 2d 695 (La. 1973); Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20,
258 So. 2d 857 (1972); Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971). The purpose
behind such a presumption may be administrative convenience or a genuine belief that
the mother will be the better parent.
NOTES
Furthermore, the father will be awarded custody only where the
mother is determined "morally unfit or otherwise unsuitable."I These
situations have been limited to those in which the mother was guilty
of an "adulterous relationship which was calculated, open and public
. . . [which] continued over a substantial period of time, in total
disregard of basic moral principles of our society.'
Even this narrow category has been severely limited in Fulco v.
Fulco.7 In that case, the trial court found that the wife's adulterous
conduct was calculated, continuous and public, but because she and
the children had moved in with her mother after the custody rule was
filed, the trial judge allowed the custody to remain with the mother.,
The supreme court upheld the trial court although the wife's miscon-
duct had definitely constituted unsuitability sufficient to require a
custody award to the father. However, as a result of the presumption
that the mother has the paramount right to custody,' the supreme
court, as criticized by Justice Sanders,
endow[ed] a temporary adjustment made after the custody-
changing machinery [had] already begun to operate with the
power to wipe out all past misconduct of the custodian. Such a
rule is unsound and inconsistent with the judicial goal of promot-
ing the welfare of children."0
Furthermore, the supreme court seems to favor the mother with-
out regard to the child's environmental stability.' In Estes v. Estes"
a mother sought to obtain the custody of her children from the fa-
5. Abreo v. Abreo, 281 So. 2d 695 (La. 1973); Estes v. Estes. 261 La. 20, 258 So.
2d 857 (1972); Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Nieto v. Nieto, 276
So. 2d 362 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Gustin v. Tregle, 275 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973).
6. Strother v. Strother, 248 So. 2d 867, 871 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
7. 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971). Fulco is continuously cited as the leading
authority in today's custody determinations. Abreo v. Abreo, 281 So. 2d 695 (La. 1973);
Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 258 So.2d 857 (1972); Nieto v. Nieto, 276 So. 2d 362 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1973); Gustin v. Tregle, 275 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
8. The judge declared this move was "the only thing that has saved Mrs. Fulco,
Jr. from losing her children." Fulco v. Fulco, no. 190,158, at 3, 6-7 (1st La. Jud. Dist.
1971). The appellate court reversed the trial court decision because it determined that
Mrs. Fulco's move, rather than remedying the conditions which were detrimental to
the interests and welfare of her children, made it possible for her to continue her
misconduct. Fulco v. Fulco, 245 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
9. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 1128, 254 So. 2d 603, 605 (1971).
10. Id. at 1131, 254 So. 2d at 606-07 (dissenting opinion).
11. Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 258 So. 2d 857 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
12. 261 La. 20, 258 So. 2d 857 (1972).
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ther.' Even though the trial court did not determine that such a
change would serve the better interests of the children, the supreme
court granted her custody because she, as a mother, had a greater
"right" to the children. 4
Such a preference to the mother may be constitutionally at-
tacked as violative of the father's and child's interests.'5 If the ration-
ale behind a preference to the mother is based upon the idea that the
mother, because she is a woman, is better suited for rearing children,
this denies the father's interest in his children and places a great
burden upon him to assert this interest by rebutting the presumption.
In Stanley v. Illinois," the United States Supreme Court held that
an unwed father's interest in the "children he has sired and raised,
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection."' 7 By analogy to Stanley, in a custody dispute
the father's interests in the child should receive the same protection
as the mother's."1
Regardless of the constitutionality of the preference to the
13. The mother had originally been awarded custody of the children in an uncon-
tested divorce. Later, she voluntarily surrendered custody to the father and they jointly
obtained a consent judgment by which the original decree was amended to award
temporary custody to the father until such time as the mother could provide a "proper
home" for the children. After the mother was able to provide a proper home, she waited
two more years before attempting to regain custody. Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 258
So. 2d 857 (1972).
14. Justice Barham in his dissent criticizes the court for deciding "that because
the mother is woman, some superior right rides with her." Id. at 33, 258 So. 2d at 862.
15. Furthermore, there is an increasing interest in children's rights in custody
cases, especially in the due process area. The application of the standard-the best
interest of the child-without allowing the child counsel to advocate these interests
produces inadequate results and may be a violation of due process by analogy to In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which established the juvenile's right to counsel and due
process in criminal proceedings. See Inker, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody
Cases, 55 MAss. L.Q. 229 (1970).
16. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
17. Id. at 651. The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute which,
upon the death of the mother, presumed the unwed father to be an unfit parent and
made the children dependents of the state. The court emphasized a parent's interest
in the "companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children .... "
18. Futhermore, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), indicate that because this presumption is based upon sex, it would
be unconstitutionally discriminatory against the male. In Reed, a statutory provision
which gave the father preference over the mother for an appointment as administrator
of their child's estate was held unconstitutionally discriminatory as "providing dissim-
ilar treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated" in violation of the
equal protection clause. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971). In Frontiero, the court
held that different federal statutory treatment between servicemen and servicewomen
was unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause. In fact, four out of the
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mother, since one out of every four American children today must
endure his parents' divorce,' more important reasons demand an
evaluation of the procedures in custody cases. Although this pre-
sumption in favor of the mother gives the judge a convenient tool to
award custody, it prevents a thorough examination of the facts of
each case. The failure of this presumption to achieve the best inter-
ests of the children, and its discouraging effect on fathers who would
otherwise assert their custodial rights, has resulted in increasing
dissatisfaction with the present child custody procedures.', Also, the
physiological and sociological foundation upon which this preference
to the mother was originally based is no longer valid.u Continuing the
eight justices who concurred in the decision expressed the view that sex is a suspect
classification and thus, any presumptions based upon sex are subject to close judicial
scrutiny.
However, it may be argued that there are legitimate state purposes for such a
preference to the female in custody proceedings. One argument, administrative con-
venience as a justification for the presumption, is not valid. As Stanley indicates, the
Court will no longer accept convenience as a reason to deny the father and the child
due process and equal protection.
Also as stated in Reed, "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either
sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on
the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
Yet, other reasons for the presumption may be upheld. The courts could find the
mother, as the central family figure, entitled to a preference. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961), the court upheld a statute which required women to volunteer before
being called for jury duty. The Court's decision was based upon the reasoning that a
"woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." Id. at 62. It must be
pointed out, however, that this is an older case which is the product of traditional
notions of womanhood. Recently, a three-judge federal district court did not follow
Hoyt when it declared unconstitutional a similar Louisiana provision. Healy v. Ed-
wards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973).
Of course, the presumption may be upheld because the courts will conclude that
the bonds between a mother and her child are stronger than those between the father
and child, and thus, the child's welfare demands a presumption. Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 665 (1972) (Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion).
Although Reed, Frontiero, and Stanley involve statutory discrimination, their
holdings indicate that the presumptive preference to the mother in child custody cases,
whether statutory or jurisprudential, is unconstitutional.
19. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM.
L. 101 (1962).
20. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW
& Soc. REv. 167 (1969).
21. Id.
22. Physiologically, fewer mothers are nursing their infants, and after this period,
for those who do, there is no reason why a mother is better suited to rear a child.
Sociologically, with the employment of more than forty percent of all married women,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.23 (1973), and the increasing number of
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preference in order to maintain the traditional notion of the woman's
role as "homemaker and child-tender" is not a legitimate reason for
failing to thoroughly investigate both parents' ability to meet the
needs of the child.23
One solution to the inequities in child custody awards would be
to literally adhere to the provisions of article 157, granting custody
to the party who obtained the divorce .2 However, at the time this
article was first enacted "no fault" divorces did not exist; the custody
determination was to reward the party not at fault and to presume
that this party would be a better parent. As a result of the availability
of "no fault" divorce,25 the applicability of article 157 in this manner
would be precluded. Nevertheless, by analogy to article 160, which
takes into consideration such divorces, 26 article 157 could be re-
stricted to awarding custody to the spouse who obtained the divorce
only if that spouse were not at fault. However, this approach would
use child custody awards to punish the guilty spouse rather than meet
the needs of the child. It is not inconceivable that the spouse judi-
cially at fault would actually be the more capable party to rear the
children. Furthermore, there are more realistic grounds than fault
upon which to decide questions of custody and support. 7
Child custody should be awarded according to the individual
parent's capabilities and situation in relation to how these will affect
the child's needs and desires. Articles 146 and 157 should be repealed
and replaced with provisions which would guide the judge in the child
custody determinations. Of course, in the child custody area, strict
rules can easily lead to inequities. Child-oriented criteria established
as guidelines should be based upon the rights of children to economic
and educational security and emotional stability," and would require
an extensive fact-finding process by the court.2 "
Economic security would include the parent's ability to provide
the children with necessities, cultural development and entertain-
men who are experiencing domestic duties, an automatic preference to the mother
eliminates recognition of the fact that the child's welfare may be best served by award-
ing custody to the father.
23. Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 28, 258 So. 2d 857, 860 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 157.
25. LA. R.S. 9:301 (1950). For example, living separate and apart for two years.
26. Civil Code article 160 deals with alimony to the wife after divorce. The former
article stated the wife who obtained the divorce was entitled to alimony; the new
article allows the wife to obtain alimony regardless of who obtained the divorce if the
wife can prove she is not at fault. By analogy, article 157 can be extended to allow the
non-faultor (regardless of who obtained the separation or divorce judgment) to be
granted child custody.
27. Couch, Toward a More Realistic Divorce Law, 43 TuL. L. REV. 243 (1969).
28. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modern American Family Law, 2 J. FAM.
L. 101 (1962).
29. The judge could appoint an investigator or counsel to advocate the child's
interests. Inker, A Child's Right to Counsel in Custody Cases, 55 MAss. L.Q. 229
(1970). Wisconsin adopts this approach by providing a court-appointed guardian ad
[Vol. 34
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ment. : For educational security, the court could determine which
schools the children would be attending if they lived with either
parent, the quality of the education at these schools, and the learning
environment which would prevail at home.
The fact-finding process which would enable the court to deter-
mine which parental environment could provide the most emotional
stability for the child is more complex. This would include a determi-
nation of the child's age; his preference if old enough to make an
intelligent judgment; the religious preference of the child and each
parent;" the moral fitness of the parent and its effect upon the child;
each parent's emotional stability; the failure or success of the parent
to provide adequate care or guidance during the periods in which the
child had been in his or her control;3" the effect a change in actual
custody would have; and where and with whom the child would spend
most of his time.
Several recently enacted and proposed statutes in other jurisdic-
tions have utilized these factors in creating procedures to govern child
custody cases. :  Colorado's procedure in contested child custody cases
could be a model for any revision in Louisiana law. It states that no
party because of sex shall be presumed to be better able than another
to serve the interests of the child. 4 Colorado requires an investigation
by the court's probation office or the local welfare department into
the ability of each party to fulfill the needs of the child.35 The investi-
gators make findings of fact and file a report with the court, but do
not make recommendations as to which party should be awarded
custody . 6 The court, however, uses this report as an aid in its deci-
sion.:7
litem to represent the children if the court has reason for special concern for their
future welfare. The guardian's fee shall be paid by either or both parties or the county
as directed by the court. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.045 (1971).
30. Although financial resources of the parent is a factor, child support provisions
would diminish the importance of such a finding.
31. In many families, the child may be affiliated with one religion while one of
the parents prefers another or none at all. If religion is important to the child's develop-
ment and personal happiness, the separation from the parent who encourages his
religious participation may lead to the emotional distress of the child.
32. Comment, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 262, 265 (1968-69).
33. COL. R.S. 46-1-24 (1971); ME. R.S.A. 19:751 (1967); Proposed Statute, Pro-
ceedings of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association 38 (1963). See
Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW & Soc.
REV. 167 (1969-70); Leavell, Custody Disputes and the Proposed Model Act, 2 GA. L.
REV. 162 (1968).
34. COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5(7) (1967).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Similarly, Louisiana judges could utilitize their juvenile officers as inde-
pendent investigators who would file a report which would include hearsay (e.g., from
neighbors) as well as facts regarding the home conditions of the parties and child's
school attendance and records. The report could be subject to rebuttal and could be
placed in the record.
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In the interests of environmental stability,"" any law which is
enacted in Louisiana should continue to provide for a mandatory
determination of custody by the judge at the time of judicial separa-
tion or divorce and should discourage further litigation.' Actually, if
a more child-oriented custody scheme is enacted and used to deter-
mine who shall initially be granted custody, much less litigation on
that issue would follow. Furthermore, the presumption that the origi-
nal custodian should be continued is one preference which is valid
and has its basis in the welfare of the children.4 '
The present statutory and jurisprudential scheme which gives
preference to the mother in child custody cases is not in the best
interest of the children. This presumption furthers the traditional
philosophy that only a woman can appropriately rear children and is
a judicial tool to conveniently administer these cases. The grant of
38. This is desirable because evidence reveals that continuity of parental care and
environmental stability are more important to the child than the individual attributes
of the parent and his particular desires. Furthermore, subsequent- litigation is often
traumatic for the child. Justice Barham's dissent in Estes expresses his concern over
this issue: "Children should not be uprooted and removed from a loving and secure
environment afforded by one parent unless there are exceptional and substantial rea-
sons advantageous to the welfare of the children for making the change. In deciding
what are the good and substantial reasons for change of child custody, if there is any
legal advantage with either parent it is with the one in whose custody the children have
been for some time." Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 21, 258 So. 2d 857, 861 (1972) (dissent-
ing opinion).
39, Civil Code article 157 presently provides that the person awarded custody is
the tutor, and that the judge "shall" make a custody determination regardless of
wlhether it is contested. Thus, any subsequent attempt at a change in custody should
actually be a divestiture of tutorship proceedings which requires especially close scru-
tiny by the court. Removal of a tutor is based upon his disqualification under Code of
Civil Procedure articles 4231 or 4234 which include such reasons as mental incompe-
tency, physical incapacity, bad moral character, abandonment of the child, failure or
incapacity to discharge the duties of a tutor, mismanagement of the minor's property,
or failure to perform any duty imposed by the court or by law. Furthermore, the burden
is on the tutor to show why he should not be removed from office.
Presently, there is a debate between Justice Barham of the Louisiana supreme
court (see Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So. 2d 217 (1972)) and Professor Robert
Pascal (see 16 LA. B.J. 267 (1968)) on the issue of whether a natural tutor must be
appointed prior to assuming his position. Professor Pascal asserts article 157 of the
Civil Code to argue that the natural tutor assumes his position, without appointment
as such, upon being granted child custody; thus, any subsequent proceedings concern-
ing custody are more properly considered tutorship proceedings and require applica-
tion of the appropriate tutorial provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. Justice
Barham contends that the natural tutor must be appointed; thus, custody and natural
tutorship are separate and the jurisprudential "change in custody" procedures will
govern custody determinations after the original award.
40. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication, 4 LAW
& Soc. REV. 167 (1969).
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custody to one parent or the other could very well be the most impor-
tant decision in a child's life. Due to the present system's failure in
such a crucial determination to meet the needs of the child, reevalua-
tion and revision of child custody procedures is in order by both the
courts and the legislature.
Lila Tritico
